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Abstract—Convolutional Neural Network’s (CNN’s) perfor-
mance disparity on clean and corrupted datasets has recently
been noticed. In this work, we analyse common corruptions
from a frequency perspective, i.e., High Frequency corruptions
or HFc (e.g., noise) and Low Frequency corruptions or LFc
(e.g., blur). A common signal processing solution to HFc is low-
pass filtering. Intriguingly, the de-facto Activation Function (AF)
used in modern CNNs, i.e., ReLU does not have any filtering
mechanism resulting in unstable performance on HFc. In this
work, we propose a family of novel AFs with low-pass filtering
to improve robustness against HFc (we call it Low-Pass ReLU
or LP-ReLU). To deal with LFc, we further enhance the AFs
with Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) based augmentation. LP-
ReLU coupled with DCT augmentation, enables a deep network
to tackle a variety of corruptions. We evaluate our method’s
performance on CIFAR-10-C and Tiny ImageNet-C datasets and
achieve improvements of 5.1% and 7.2% in accuracy respectively
compared to the State-Of-The-Art (SOTA). We further evaluate
our method’s performance stability on a variety of perturbations
available in CIFAR-10-P and Tiny ImageNet-P. We also achieve
new SOTA results in these experiments. We also devise a decision
space visualisation process to further strengthen the understand-
ing regarding CNN’s lack of robustness against corrupted data.
Index Terms—CNN, Robust Image Classification, Activation
Function, ReLU, Low-Pass Filtering, Input Corruption, Image
Corruption, Data Augmentation.
I. INTRODUCTION
DEEP Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) generallyachieve high classification and recognition accuracy on
i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed) benchmarks.
However, performance deteriorates on corrupted datasets even
when the corruption is visually imperceptible. This is par-
ticularly concerning for real-world safety-critical applications
where the i.i.d. assumption does not always hold. For ex-
ample, a self-driving car should not presume to have ideal
driving conditions at all times. Optical sensors are expected
to encounter a wide range of corruptions stemming from
trivial physical phenomena (e.g. signal noise, motion, and
defocus blur), variable weather conditions (e.g. brightness,
snow, frost, and fog), and digital artefacts (e.g. pixelate effect,
and data compression). Therefore, accounting for corruptions
at inference time and closing the performance gap between
clean and corrupted datasets are important.
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Different data augmentation techniques [1]–[4] are widely
used to address this issue. In addition to data augmentation,
adversarial training [5]–[8], self-supervised learning [9], [10]
and loss function optimization [9], [11] are some of the other
ways explored to enhance CNN’s robustness against such
corruptions.
In this work, we take a different approach and investigate
corruptions from the frequency domain. We emphasise on the
role of Activation Functions (AFs) and argue that if designed
properly, AFs can substantially enhance CNN’s robustness
against corruptions. Currently, ReLU [12] is the most widely
used AF because of its computational efficiency and better
optimisation/convergence to training data compared to other
AFs [13]. ReLU does not suffer from the vanishing gradient
problem [14] and it allows very deep networks to be optimised
through backpropagation. However, ReLU and a number of
its variants lack robustness against common corruptions (as
shown later in Section IV).
By definition, ReLU blocks out any negative input but
does not alter positive input at all. Therefore, the interme-
diate features inside ReLU-based networks become sparse.
Sparse features maximise the inter-class distance to gain high
classification accuracy but could compromise the classifica-
tion performance with their higher intra-class dispersion (see
Figure 1(a)). This compromise does not harm CNN’s overall
performance so long as the evaluation dataset is i.i.d. or
clean. However, the compromise (i.e., feature sparsity) gets
exposed in the presence of input corruptions - especially
High Frequency corruptions or HFc (e.g., Gaussian or speckle
noise). HFc, even when visually imperceptible, can cause
the corrupted data to shift to a different part of the feature
space [15] in the absence of a low-pass filter. This leads to
misclassification.
The classic signal processing fix to a HFc is low-pass
filtering. For example, voice recorders use low-pass filtering
to cancel the ‘hiss’ noise originating from electromagnetic
interference. As shown by Campbell et al., [16], Human Visual
System (HVS) also has limited sensitivity to abrupt or high
frequency changes owing to an inherent low-pass filtering
process. This particular property of HVS is later exploited
in JPEG image compression as well [17]. Inspired from these
observations, we incorporate a low-pass filtering mechanism
inside the proposed AF, namely, Low-Pass ReLU (LP-ReLU)
and show its efficacy against corruptions - especially HFc. LP-
ReLU limits feature shift and misclassification by enforcing a
compact feature space (see Figure 1(b)).
As for Low Frequency corruptions (LFc) in an image (e.g.,
Gaussian or motion blur), one might think of AFs with high
2Fig. 1. (a) ReLU allows activations or features to flow through network layers without any filtering. This introduces sparsity in the feature space. Such
sparsity can cause shift in the feature space in the presence of data corruption, even when corruption is visually imperceptible. (b) Our proposed AF has
low-pass filter built-in which enforces feature compactness. This, in effect, limits the internal feature shift and resists corrupted features from drifting away.
(c)-(d) As discussed later in Section III-A, robustness against LFc demand better distinction for weak features (weak features reside in the centre of the above
plots). DCT data augmentation [1] improves robustness for both AFs, i.e., ReLU (c), and LP-ReLU (d)- especially against LFc by increasing the inter-class
distance (distance among weak features) in the centre. See the zoomed insets for comparison. Despite overall improvement, feature sparsity still exists in
ReLU (c), which makes it vulnerable to corruptions. The plots shown here represent absolute CNN features without any dimensionality reduction. Details of
this visualisation process are provided in Section V.
pass filtering as a potential fix. However, corrupted features
from LFc substantially overlap with meaningful image features
(details in Section III). Using a high pass filter can rather make
things worse by discarding meaningful features along with the
corrupted ones. Therefore, LFc demand another way around.
We find that a data augmentation method based on Discrete
Cosine Transform (DCT) [1] can further boost overall ro-
bustness, especially against LFc. DCT augmentation provides
greater distinction for weak features (at the centre region of the
feature space) with LFc (see Figures 1(c) and 1(d)). Feature
characteristics for both HFc and LFc are discussed in details
in Section III.
We evaluate on benchmark datasets (CIFAR-10-C and
Tiny ImageNet-C [5]) containing common corruptions (e.g.,
noise, and blur). We further conduct performance stability
tests on perturbed datasets (CIFAR-10-P and Tiny ImageNet-
P [5]). Experimental results show that LP-ReLU provides
better robustness and stability against corruptions compared
to contemporary works.
We also stress the importance of visualisation of the learned
decision space to better understand the dynamics of CNN’s
robustness against common corruptions. To this end, we devise
a way of visualising the learned decision space. We show
that the learned decision boundaries extend to infinity, and
extreme misclassification occurs far away from the manifold.
This observation reiterates the importance of a compact feature
space to suppress the detrimental effects of corruptions.
To summarise, the following are the main contributions we
make in this work,
• We analyse image corruptions from a frequency per-
spective. We demonstrate that CNN’s weakness against
corrupted data can be addressed by using appropriate
AFs.
• We propose novel AFs, namely LP-ReLU, by embedding
low-pass filtering properties with ReLU.
• We further enhance LP-ReLUs with DCT based augmen-
tation [1], especially for LFc.
• For an understanding of CNN’s overall robustness against
data corruptions, we visually illustrate CNN’s decision
boundaries and intermediate feature space.
• Finally, we extensively evaluate the accuracy and stability
of our proposed method1 on benchmark datasets and
demonstrate the efficacy of our method in improving
CNN’s robustness.
1Code available at https://github.com/tahmid0007/Low Pass ReLU.
3The rest of the paper is organised as followed: Section
II discusses the related work. The proposed AFs and the
recommended augmentation methodology are discussed in
Section III. Section IV provides details on the benchmark
datasets, extensively evaluates the performance of different
networks, and outlines the implementation details. Section V
presents the proposed decision space visualization process.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Robustness Against Distortion
Although a sizable body of work is available on adversarial
examples [6], [15], i.e., images which are purposely generated
to fail the network, common form of corruptions (e.g., image
noise, blur, fog and frost) have received limited attention. Real-
world applications are expected to encounter such naturally
occurring corruptions. As argued in [5], these simple corrup-
tions heavily degrade CNN’s performance as well and deserve
separate attention.
Dodge et al. [18] study the impact of corruptions in terms
of image quality degradation on CNN and report that CNN’s
performance starts deteriorating even when the corruption is
visually imperceptible. They train an ensemble of networks
[19] where each network becomes expert on a specific degra-
dation. Hossain et al. [1] report similar findings and propose
a DCT based data augmentation technique to ameliorate
robustness.
Upon realising CNN’s susceptibility to input corruptions,
Hendrycks et al. [5] has recently published a range of bench-
mark datasets with 19 common corruptions. A number of
works [5], [7] found adversarial training to strengthen CNN’s
robustness on these datasets, but this claim was later criticised
by Rusak et al. [20]. In [20], authors argue that performance
gain achieved through adversarial training do not translate
consistently to common corruptions. Rather, they propose a
data augmentation technique where generative networks are
used to produce a wide array of noisy images. Performance
improvement is observed on most of the noisy and some of
the blur type corruptions.
AutoAugment [2] is another augmentation technique that
was initially designed to boost clean performance. It incorpo-
rates a method to dynamically choose from a pool of image
processing policies during training. Recently, AutoAugment is
found to be effective in improving CNN’s robustness against
common corruptions as well [4], [21]. Hendrycks et al. [4]
build on the work of AutoAugment and propose an improved
augmentation technique called AugMix. In AugMix, a chain
of augmentation techniques is applied to an image and layered
together. These images are argued to be more natural and close
to the original images, unlike some of the other works [3],
[22]–[24]. It is worth noting that some of the augmentation
methodologies produce images with similarity to a few of the
corruptions present in the test set. For instance, Gaussian and
Speckle noise augmentations appear in [20], [25]. Similarly,
posterisation processing used in [4] visually resembles one of
the corruptions (JPEG compression) present in the test set.
Such overlaps lead to performance gain in the corresponding
corruption category. However, this gain does not always gen-
eralise well to unseen corruptions as outlined in [26].
Zhang et al. [27] argue that the conventional Max-Pooling
violates Nyquist Sampling theorem resulting in enhanced
sensitivity to corruption. As a fix, blurred pooling is used right
before down-sampling.
Self-supervised training, in addition to conventional super-
vised training, has been reported to yield promising results in
[9]. An auxiliary 4-way head is trained to predict the rotation
angle of an input which is found to improve overall robustness
as well. Sun et al. [10] further improve on [9] and enable test
time parameter update, i.e., online learning.
B. Activation Functions
Adding non-linearities in the form of AFs has been an
integral part of deep CNNs learning process. In the early
phase, Sigmoidal functions were widely used but later got
sidelined as they suffer from the vanishing gradient problem
[14]. Sigmoidal functions squash values within a finite range
(typically [0, 1] or [−1, 1]) which leaves saturation points on
both sides making it impossible to find a slope in these regions.
This halts the error backpropagation, and the network struggles
to reach the global minima. This issue becomes particularly
severe in very deep networks where the loss has to travel back
a long way to have meaningful learning. Rectified Linear Unit
or ReLU does not suffer from the vanishing gradient problem
and has long been the ‘de-facto’ AF in deep networks. We
will next discuss the pros and cons of different AFs found in
the literature.
ReLU. ReLU [28], [29] is a piece-wise linear monotonic
function. It simply does not have any response on the negative
side, and any positive value remains unchanged (Equation 1).
ReLU is easy to compute [12], a derivative is available every-
where along with the positive range, which makes it a great
choice for deep networks. It is also hypothesised to mimic
the biological neuron firing process to justify its effectiveness.
This correlation, however, is disputed in [30] based on the IFM
(Integrate and Fire Model [31]) in biological neuron. Unlike
ReLU where the output slope is always constant (45◦, see
Figure 2), according to IFM, the biological neuron’s output
slope varies depending on the resistance present in the cell
membrane.
f(x) = max(0, x) (1)
As shown later in Section IV-E, ReLU’s unbounded nature
leads to feature sparsity and lets small corruptions to cause
the feature of its data to shift significantly away from their
clean version, even when corruption is negligible. This results
in misclassification. In simple words, ReLU allows CNNs to
achieve impressive accuracy on clean set but makes CNN
vulnerable to data corruptions.
Leaky ReLU and Parametric ReLU. Because ReLU has a
zero response for negative values, a large number of neurons
may never fire in the absence of proper initialization and
hyper-parameter setup [32] resulting in ‘dead neurons’. Leaky
ReLU has been proposed [32] to address the dead neuron
problem by introducing a small constant slope (α = .01) on
the negative side (Equation 2). Leaky ReLU has a derivative
4Fig. 2. Activation Functions f(x) and their corresponding 1st derivatives D(x). The proposed variants of Activation Functions, i.e., LP-ReLU1 and LP-ReLU2
are highlighted in the lower right panel.
on both sides of the origin (Figure 2). In Parametric ReLU
(P-ReLU) [33], the slope α is set up as a learnable parameter
rather than a constant and accuracy improvement is reported
[33]. However, leaky variants do not consistently outperform
vanilla ReLU across datasets.
f(x) =
{
x, x > 0,
αx, otherwise
(2)
Clipped ReLU. Clipped ReLU (C-ReLU) [34] is simply
vanilla ReLU clipped to a constant based on a threshold A
(Equation 3). Clipped ReLU was initially proposed in speech
recognition [34] to increase training stability by avoiding
gradient explosion. Later, it found its way in computer vision
and other domains of deep learning as well. For example,
Clipped ReLU’s finite output range is found to be handy
in applications where number representation capability is
limited [13]. Despite Clipped ReLU’s different set of use-
cases, it incorporates a hard low pass filtering which leaves
large saturation points in the bounded region (see Figure 2).
Consequently, vanishing gradient remains a problem, and there
is no way to discriminate features beyond the threshold A.
f(x) =
{
max(0, x), 0 < x ≤ A,
A, x > A
(3)
Tent Function. Tent AF [35] is built from two ReLU units
and it is symmetric around the origin (Equation 4). It is
designed to resist adversarial attacks but unlike ReLU, this
AF is not monotonic and has large saturation regions on both
sides beyond a threshold δ (see Figure 2).
f(x; δ) = max(0, δ − |x|) (4)
Log-tailed ReLU. As the name suggests, Log-tailed ReLU
[36] is identical to ReLU up to a threshold A. The growth
of the function is logarithmic thereafter [A,∞). However, this
tail part rapidly converges to clipped ReLU with increasing x
as can be seen from Equation 5 and Figure 2.
f(x) =


0, x ≤ 0,
x, 0 < x ≤ A,
A+ log(x−A), x > A
(5)
Tanh Function. Hyperbolic tangent function or tanh is
sigmoidal in shape and squashes values inside a finite range
of [−1, 1] (Equation 6). tanh is centred around the origin. It
has faster convergence compared to other sigmoidal functions
because of the wider output range [37]. However, it still has
large saturated regions on both sides of the origin.
f(x) = tanh(x) =
sinh(x)
cosh(x)
=
1− e−2x
1 + e−2x
(6)
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
Achieving robustness against corruptions requires an in-
depth understanding of the properties of different corruptions.
In this section, we analyse corruptions from the frequency
domain instead of spatial domain.
A. Frequency Domain Analysis
Commonly found image corruptions can be broadly cate-
gorised into two segments: HFc and LFc [21]. We argue that
successfully handling the entire corruption spectrum, i.e., both
HFc and LFc, is at the core of achieving a desired level of
classification robustness.
Noise is a common form of corruption (e.g. Gaussian
noise) that spans uniformly across the frequency spectrum
and thereby falls in the HFc category [21]. Blur, on the other
hand, is another common form of corruption that removes high
frequency information from an image and thereby falls in the
LFc category (e.g. Gaussian blur) [21].
High Frequency Corruptions. Low-pass filtering is the com-
mon operator in signal processing applications for removing
5frequencies beyond a cut-off point that is deemed as nuisance.
We observe that an image with HFc induces strong False
Positive features or activations compared to its clean coun-
terpart (see Figure 3). In other words, convolution kernels fire
strongly on HFc and these hyperactive False Positive features
are fed to ReLU. As ReLU does not filter positive input (i.e.,
features with values > 0) at all, such False Positive features
are allowed to flow through the network layers. Consequently,
these corrupted features exploit the sparsity offered by ReLU
and trigger heavy shift in the feature space. This way, features
easily end up on the wrong side of the decision boundary
causing misclassification (details in Section IV-E).
Low Frequency Corruptions. As stated earlier, LFc do not
have an easy filtering fix. The underlying reasons can be better
understood if we move from spatial to frequency domain.
As observed in Figure 3, convolution kernels fire weakly
on LFc. Contrary to HFc, this implies that the LFc induce
relatively weaker features2 that congregate in the centre region
of the feature space (as shown in Figure 1). For example,
a vertical edge detector kernel would produce strong output
features each time it convolves over a sharp vertical edge
present in an image. However, the same kernel would produce
weaker features if the vertical edge is not sharp enough (e.g.,
loss of sharpness due to LFc).
It is known from DCT analysis that most of the energy (of a
natural image) is concentrated on the low frequency spectrum
[17]. Unlike HFc, features from LFc substantially overlap with
meaningful features (see Figure 3). Consequently, the classic
fix, i.e., using a high-pass filter is not a viable option as such
a filtering might drop corrupted features as well as legitimate
ones. This loss of information would not be recoverable and
result in performance deterioration.
We argue that a data augmentation technique capable of
mimicking LFc can significantly boost robustness not only
against LFc but also against HFc.
B. Proposed Activation Function: LP-ReLU
Inspired by the HVS and traditional signal processing fix
for HFc, we design two variants of low pass filters for our
proposed AFs. Before explaining further, there are a couple
of key differences between the proposed and traditional low-
pass filtering we would like to highlight:
• Unlike the traditional fix where everything beyond a
cut off frequency is completely ignored, we use a soft
filtering technique with a signal attenuation factor that
we call Filtering Factor. Note that completely cutting
off the signal beyond a threshold would resurface the
vanishing gradient problem (similar to Clipped-ReLU).
• In traditional low-pass filtering operator, a cut-off fre-
quency is chosen based on the maximum frequency avail-
able in the signal of interest (following Nyquist Theorem
[38]). However, computing such a cut-off frequency is
complicated for visual datasets like images. Hence, we
design two low pass filter variants in our AF namely LP-
2By weak activation or feature, we refer to the smaller magnitude of
absolute values produced from each convolution operation.
ReLU1 (one cut-off point) and LP-ReLU2 (two cut-off
points) with different cut-off point selection strategies.
C. LP-ReLU1
Equation 7 represents the first variant of our proposed AF,
i.e., LP-ReLU1. A closer look into Equation 7 reveals that, LP-
ReLU1, upto a threshold A, is equivalent to ReLU. Beyond
this threshold, the input features get attenuated by a Filtering
Factor α (α ∈ [0, 1]). Note that α = 0 will be equivalent to
Clipped ReLU. α = 1, on the other hand, would make LP-
ReLU1 equivalent to ReLU.
F (x) =


0, x ≤ 0,
x, x ∈ (0, A],
A+ αx, x > A
(7)
Equation 8 denotes the derivative of LP-ReLU1 at each
piece-wise linear stage. It is evident that LP-ReLU1 has a slope
at every point beyond the origin, which is a much-desired
property for training any neural network. See the graphical
representations of LP-ReLU1 and its derivative in Figure 2.
D(x) =


0, x ≤ 0,
1, x ∈ (0, A],
α, x > A
(8)
D. LP-ReLU2
In contrast to LP-ReLU1, LP-ReLU2 has two cut-off points
A, and B (A < B) in series and two corresponding Filtering
Factors α, and β (α > β) as can be seen from Equation 9.
The graphical representations of LP-ReLU2 and its derivative
are shown in Figure 2.
LP-ReLU2’s effectiveness against corruptions can be at-
tributed to the following reasons:
• Phase 1 (soft) filtering. A relatively larger α, i.e., α→ 1
(for x ∈ (A,B]) allows greater feature sparsity in the
center, i.e., sparsity for weak features in the center region
where LFc congregate (as shown in Figure 1). This initial
soft filtering gives our network enough sparsity in the
centre to classify weak features in distinct regions.
• Phase 2 (hard) filtering. A relatively smaller β, i.e.,
β → 0 (for x > B) means enhanced compactness
for large x, i.e., towards the perimeter of the feature
space. This hard filtering stage suppresses HFc, and limits
feature shift by ensuring a compact feature space. These
properties benefit the network’s performance against LFc
as well.
F (x) =


f 1(x) = 0, x ≤ 0,
f 2(x) = x, x ∈ (0, A],
f 3(x) = A+ αx, x ∈ (A,B],
f 4(x) = max(f 3(x)) + βx, x > B
(9)
Equation 10 represents the derivative of LP-ReLU2. Much
like LP-ReLU1, LP-ReLU2 also has a slope at every piece-
wise linear stage.
6Fig. 3. Histograms of ReLU output from clean images (Left), images with LFc (Middle), and images with HFc (Right). Horizontal axis denotes the magnitude
of a feature or activation and the vertical axis denotes the number of activations having a certain magnitude. These plots show that the HFc indeed induce
hyperactive features with large output magnitude (Right) and LFc induce relatively weak features (Middle). The histogram with weak features (LFc) overlaps
with the clean one (Left) and hence LFc are harder to distinguish. These plots on clean, LFc and HFc also provide a heuristic on the potential cut-off points
(A and B) in the proposed LP-ReLU as discussed in Section III-E.
Fig. 4. Empirical analysis for a suitable F iltering Factor α in LP-ReLU1.
Notice that α = .05 yields the best results and α = 1 simply replicates the
results of ReLU.
Fig. 5. Empirical analysis of β as a function of decreasing α in LP-ReLU2.
Here, α is the phase 1 and β is the phase 2 F iltering Factor.
D(x) =


0, x ≤ 0,
1, x ∈ (0, A],
α, x ∈ (A,B],
β, x > B
(10)
Overall, LP-ReLU2 shows us successfully handling the
entire corruption spectrum requires separate attention, i.e.,
sparsity for LFc and compactness for HFc.
E. Cut-off Point and Filtering Factor
For LP-ReLU1, the cut-off value A is set as a learnable
parameter initialized with the value 6 based on heuristic [39].
Filtering Factor α is empirically chosen as 0.05. It can be
seen from Figure 4 that α = 0.05 yields the best performance
across datasets and the accuracy converges with ReLU for
α = 1.
For LP-ReLU2, we tried to cast the cut-off values A and
B as learnable parameters individually and in conjunction
in multiple separate attempts. However, the network cannot
maintain a buffer between these thresholds in-spite of a large
difference in initialisation. For instance, we started with A = 5
and B = 20, but at the end of training found B ≤ A.
Therefore, we cast both B, and β as network hyperparameters,
just like many others used for training CNNs. We investigate
a histogram-based approach to serve as a heuristic to initialise
these hyperparameters. As can be seen from Figure 3, we plot
the average ReLU output histogram for the clean, LFc, and
HFc. The LFc histogram shows that most of the ReLU output
is smaller than A and the clean histogram shows that most
of the ReLU output is smaller than B. ReLU output in the
HFc histogram exists well beyond A. As for LFc, the output
substantially overlaps with the clean output (since A < B).
This is why we choose A as the first cut-off point (with a soft
Filtering Factor α) and B as the second cut-off point (with
a hard Filtering Factor β).
Filtering Factor α is the same as the one in LP-ReLU1
and β is empirically chosen as shown in Figure 5. Although the
empirical analysis is based on the Tiny ImageNet dataset, the
same hyperparameter setup works well for CIFAR-10 as well.
We observed that the performance variance is marginal as long
as these hyperparameters oscillate between optimal and near-
optimal values because other learnable parameters (e.g., filter
weights and bias) compensate for varying hyperparameters.
This allows the hyperparameters to be portable across datasets.
F. DCT Augmentation
To further strengthen CNN’s robustness against corruptions-
especially LFc, we incorporate DCT data augmentation [1]
along-side LP-ReLU. DCT data augmentation randomly drops
low impact HF information based on DCT coefficients. Be-
cause of the randomness, some LF information gets dropped
7Fig. 6. Sample images from DCT augmentation [1]. First image in each row
is the clean one and drop of information based on DC coefficient intensifies
from left to right.
as well, which is found to be more effective as it introduces
data diversity [1]. Unlike JPEG compression [17], a block
size equal to the input’s spatial resolution is used. DCT data
augmentation is corruption agnostic but generalises well to a
wide array of common corruptions- especially LFc. The impact
of DCT data augmentation coupled with LP-ReLU, can be
visually seen from Figure 1 as the centre region (LFc) becomes
much more distinct. Samples derived from DCT augmentation
can be seen in Figure 6.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Datasets
To evaluate robustness of a deep classifier, the following
datasets are used:
CIFAR-10 and Tiny ImageNet3. CIFAR-10 [40] has 50,000
32 × 32 × 3 clean images equally distributed in 10 classes.
The split is 50,000 training images and 10,000 test images.
Tiny ImageNet [41] is an ImageNet [42] subset comprising of
100,000 clean training images with 200 classes. Each image
has a spatial resolution of 64×64×3. Each of the classes has
500 training and 50 test images (total 10,000 test images).
CIFAR-10-C and Tiny ImageNet-C. CIFAR-10-C [5] is
effectively the corrupted variant of CIFAR-10 test set. There
are a total of 19 corruption types categorised into noise,
blur, weather, and digital corruptions. Each image within a
particular corruption type undergoes five increasing levels of
severity to ensure a thorough evaluation. Thereby, CIFAR-10-
C has 19× 10, 000× 5 or 950, 000 test images in total.
The corruption induction process for Tiny ImageNet-C [5]
is identical to that of CIFAR-10-C. In total, Tiny ImageNet
also has 19× 10, 000× 5 or 950, 000 test images.
CIFAR-10-P and Tiny ImageNet-P. Both these datasets
contain perturbed images of the clean datasets to test the
performance stability. Each example here is a short video
of about 30 frames containing 10 perturbations including
noise (Gaussian and shot), blur (motion and zoom), weather
conditions (snow and brightness), and affine transformations
(Translate, rotation, scaling, and tilt). Frames within a video
clip contain progressively increasing perturbations to challenge
network stability. Unlike corruptions, stability is not measured
3From here on, whenever we mention clean data set or clean accuracy, we
refer to the original dataset contained in either CIFAR-10 or Tiny ImageNet.
with classification accuracy. Rather, the mean Flip Probability
(mFP ) is calculated over all perturbation categories. A flip
event occurs when two consecutive frames’ predictions mis-
match. A lower mFP score indicates a more robust network.
B. Evaluation Metrics
We follow the protocol outlined in [5] for evaluating
robustness against corruption and performance stability on
perturbations.
Corruption Robustness on CIFAR-10-C and Tiny
ImageNet-C. To evaluate corruption robustness, we simply
calculate the TOP-1 classification accuracy.
Perturbation Stability on CIFAR-10-P and Tiny ImageNet-
P. Instead of TOP-1 accuracy, stability is measured against
Flip Probability (FP ) which provides us a quantitative insight
of a network’s tendency to flip prediction with increasing
perturbation. To calculate FP , let us denote k perturba-
tion sequences (each with v number of frames) with S ={(
x
(i)
1 , x
(i)
2 , . . . , x
(i)
v
)}k
i=1
. For a fixed i, i.e., perturbation
type k, x
(i)
1 denotes the clean image (no perturbation) and
x
(i)
v denotes a frame with maximum (k type) perturbation.
Considering our CNN classifier as a function F , the Flip
Probability of Network F : x→ {class1, class2, . . . , classn}
on perturbation sequence S is:
FPFp =
1
k(l − 1)
k∑
i=1
l∑
j=2
1
(
F
(
x
(i)
j
)
6= F
(
x
(i)
j−1
))
(11)
Taking the mFP across all perturbations denotes the stability
metric used in this work.
Clean Accuracy on CIFAR-10 and Tiny ImageNet. Besides
evaluating on distortions and perturbations, we evaluate the
networks on the clean dataset as well. To compare the perfor-
mance on clean datasets, we calculate the TOP-1 accuracy.
C. Comparative Performance Evaluation
CIFAR-10-C and Tiny ImageNet-C. As stated earlier,
WRN-40-2 is used as the base for all our experiments. ReLU
is used as the AF in the base network. According to Table
I, ReLU achieves an average accuracy of 72.7% over all
corruptions on CIFAR-10-C. When LP-ReLU1 replaces ReLU
as AF, overall corruption accuracy stands at 78.7% (a jump
by 6%). A closer inspection reveals that LP-ReLU1 invokes
greater gains on HFc compared to the baseline (the baseline
has 77.4% and 55.1% and LP-ReLU1 has 79.5% and 75.7%
accuracy on LFc and HFc respectively). This complements the
role low-pass filtering plays in limiting the misclassification
against HFc.
LP-ReLU2 which is specifically designed to allow greater
sparsity for weaker activations, achieves 80.5% LFc and
75.15% HFc accuracy.
DCT augmentation complements both LP-ReLU variants by
boosting overall robustness- especially against LFc. LP-ReLU1
coupled with DCT augmentation achieves 84.6% accuracy on
LFc and 87% accuracy on HFc. LP-ReLU2 coupled with DCT
8Fig. 7. Performance comparison between LP-ReLU (LP-ReLU2 + DCT) and contemporary methodologies with progressively increasing corruption in CIFAR-
10-C. 1 and 5 denote lowest and highest level of corruption respectively. LP-ReLU exhibits consistently better performance across all severity levels.
augmentation achieves 89.9% accuracy on LFc and 87.1%
accuracy on HFc.
It is worth noting that the soft phase 1 filtering in LP-ReLU2
actually allows DCT augmentation to take full effect and
improve performance- especially against LFc. To be specific,
the soft phase 1 filtering provides weak features (in the
centre, as shown in Figure 1) room to be relatively sparser.
This sparsity is vital for distinguishing weak features that
congregate together. On the other hand, the hard phase 2
filtering constrains hyperactive HFc feature space and limits
features from drifting away.
For a more in-depth quantitative analysis, Figure 7 compiles
performance on each type of corruption present in CIFAR-10-
C at each available corruption severity level. LP-ReLU (LP-
ReLU2 + DCT augmentation) exhibits the best consistency
across severity levels. Performance seems to drop sharply in
ReLU network with increasing severity.
As can be seen from Table II, LP-ReLU2 + DCT augmen-
tation achieves SOTA Top-1 classification accuracy on both
the corrupted datasets (89.3% on CIFAR-10-C and 51.9%
on Tiny ImageNet-C). These are 5.1% and 7.3% better than
the previous SOTA (AugMix [4]) on CIFAR-10-C and Tiny
ImageNet-C respectively.
CIFAR-10-P and Tiny ImageNet-P. While the corrupted
datasets test the overall robustness, progressively increasing
perturbations in CIFAR-10-P and Tiny ImageNet-P frames
test the stability of network performance. Networks suffering
from robustness deficiency provide erratic predictions with
marginally varying perturbations. Robust networks, on the
other hand, do not flip predictions unless the input corrup-
tion is substantial. As can be seen from Figure 8, our pro-
posed method, i.e., LP-ReLU2 + DCT augmentation, achieves
SOTA mFP both on CIFAR-10-P (mFP 1.08%) and Tiny
ImageNet-P (mFP 2.88%). This is lower than the baseline
(mFP 4.09% on CIFAR-10-P and mFP 11.8% on Tiny
9TABLE I
TOP-1 CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY (%) ON 19 INDIVIDUAL CORRUPTIONS FROM CIFAR-10-C AND TINY IMAGENET-C WITH DIFFERENT NETWORK
CONFIGURATIONS.WRN-40-2 ARCHITECTURE IS USED IN ALL THESE NETWORKS. RELU IS USED AS THE AF ONLY IN THE BASE NETWORK. LP-RELU2
COUPLED WITH DCT AUGMENTATION PERFORMS BEST. ACCURACY IS AVERAGED OVER ALL FIVE SEVERITY LEVELS AND REPORTED IN THE LAST ROW.
THE PENULTIMATE ROW (CLEAN) REPORTS ACCURACY ON THE RESPECTIVE DISTORTION-FREE DATASET. BEST IN EACH ROW IS HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD.
CIFAR-10-C Tiny ImageNet-C
Corruption ReLU LP-ReLU1 LP-ReLU1+DCT LP-ReLU2 LP-ReLU2+DCT ReLU LP-ReLU1 LP-ReLU1+DCT LP-ReLU2 LP-ReLU2+DCT
Brightness 93.8 90.3 89.2 95.4 94.1 58.3 58.1 57.3 59.2 58.6
Contrast 74.1 74.2 75.1 75.3 80.7 33.4 29.3 34.1 30.2 33.2
Defocus blur 88.1 85.3 86.3 80.3 94.6 44.2 45.9 52.6 48.6 56.2
Elastic 81.3 79.6 82.5 79.9 90.5 45.9 45.1 48.3 45.3 51.5
Fog 81.7 84.5 85.2 85.6 91.2 48.5 49.1 52.4 49.3 53.7
Frost 64.4 74.8 84.6 75.9 90.4 35.2 39.4 48.1 40.2 49.8
Gauss blur 84.1 85.9 91.3 88.4 93.2 35.6 38.3 51.6 40.8 56.7
Gauss noise 51.1 69.5 88.4 69.4 85.1 15.1 23 38.9 22.9 42.5
Glass 47.8 53.7 73.8 53.4 78.6 21.5 23.2 37.4 23.4 40.6
Impulse noise 53.6 78.8 88.3 77.1 86.4 27.3 48.2 52.8 48.3 54.3
Jpeg 75.8 82.6 86.2 84.5 94.2 41.2 48.5 52.9 50.9 56.1
Motion blur 80.2 78.3 82.6 81.2 90.2 46.8 47.9 55.5 50.8 57.9
Pixelate 73.6 72.9 84.1 73.4 91.7 41.7 43.2 48.9 44.6 51.2
Saturate 88.1 91.7 89.9 91.9 91.6 55.4 56.1 56.4 56.5 57.7
Shot noise 59.2 76.8 86.3 77.2 88.9 33.5 45 52.3 45.2 55.1
Snow 73.3 78.3 81.1 77.9 89.3 45.2 46.7 52.9 45.3 55.2
Spatter 73.5 84.9 84.6 85.6 86.9 44.9 46.2 46.8 46.8 47.6
Speckle 56.7 77.8 85.3 76.9 88.3 21.5 33.4 45.2 33.6 49.9
Zoom blur 80.6 76.2 92.6 78.5 91.6 37.7 38.3 54.3 41.6 58.1
Clean 96.0 96.1 96.3 96.2 96.4 61.1 61.3 61.2 61.3 61.5
Average Accuracy 72.7 78.7 85.1 79.4 89.3 38.6 42.4 49.4 43.3 51.9
TABLE II
AVERAGE TOP-1 CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY (%) COMPARISON.
LP-RELU VARIANTS ALONG WITH DCT AUGMENTATION DEMONSTRATE
BETTER ROBUSTNESS ON BOTH CIFAR-10-C AND TINY IMAGENET-C.
LP-RELU1 + DCT OBTAINS 0.9% AND 4.8% IMPROVEMENT OVER THE
PREVIOUS SOTA AUGMIX ON CIFAR-10-C AND TINY IMAGENET-C
RESPECTIVELY. LP-RELU2 + DCT OBTAINS 5.1% AND 7.3%
IMPROVEMENT OVER AUGMIX ON CIFAR-10-C AND TINY IMAGENET-C,
RESPECTIVELY (BEST IS HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD).
Network CIFAR-10-C Tiny Imagenet-C
ReLU 72.7± 0.82 38.6± 0.91
Leaky-ReLU 67.2± 0.66 32.9± 0.72
P-ReLU 68.8± 0.45 33.3± 0.53
Clipped-ReLU 73.2± 0.60 39.7± 0.66
Tanh 66.9± 0.79 32.3± 0.84
Tent 73.9± 0.29 40.5± 0.33
Cutout [24] 70.1± 0.39 40.1± 0.44
Mixup [23] 72.5± 0.45 40.8± 0.49
CutMix [22] 70.8± 0.36 39.7± 0.40
AutoAugment [2] 78.8± 0.34 42.5± 0.37
AugMix [4] 84.2± 0.28 44.6± 0.30
LP-ReLU1 78.7± 0.27 42.4± 0.29
LP-ReLU1 + DCT 85.1± 0.25 49.4± 0.28
LP-ReLU2 79.4± 0.29 43.3± 0.32
LP-ReLU2 + DCT 89.3± 0.23 51.9± 0.28
ImageNet-P) and the previous SOTA AugMix [4] (mFP
1.49% on CIFAR-10-P and mFP 4.1% on Tiny ImageNet-
P).
CIFAR-10 and Tiny ImageNet (clean). Although the pro-
posed LP-ReLU has been designed to deal with corrupted im-
ages, both LP-ReLU variants maintain comparable results on
the clean datasets with small but consistent improvements over
ReLU. ReLU achieves an accuracy of 96% on clean CIFAR-
10 whereas LP-ReLU1 and LP-ReLU2 achieve 96.1% and
96.2% clean accuracy respectively. DCT augmentation slightly
improves clean accuracy on top of both LP-ReLU variants (see
Table I). As for Tiny ImageNet-C, similar performance gain
trend is observed (see Table I).
We attribute our method’s better robustness and stability
across corruptions and perturbations to our separate attention
in handling LFc and HFc. Contemporary data augmentation-
based methods [4], [22]–[24] do not account for the specific
demands from corruptions residing in opposite ends of the
frequency spectrum. To the best of our knowledge, only
[21] stresses the importance of understanding the robustness
issue from a Fourier perspective. Nonetheless, they resort
to a pre-existing augmentation technique (AutoAugment [2])
that was originally proposed to improve clean accuracy- not
robustness. AutoAugment does improve robustness as well
(as reported in [21]), but the improvement does not catch up
with ours. AugMix [4], the previous SOTA, further builds on
AutoAugment and likewise- do not consider the corruptions
through the lens of Fourier transform.
D. Implementation and Training Details
For all our tests, we use ResNet-based [43] Wide Residual
Network (WRN) [44] as the base model. Unlike ResNet,
where performance gain comes with increasing depth, WRN’s
architecture pivots around a central argument that shallower
networks with greater width lead to higher performance gain.
WRNs are denoted as WRN-d-k where d is the number of
convolutional units and k is the widening factor considering
ResNet has a widening factor of 1, i.e., k = 1. We use
WRN-40-2 with ReLU for the base model and replace ReLU
with LP-ReLU for the proposed network. We use Stochastic
Gradient Descent or SGD with Momentum 0.9. We train
the network for 160 epochs with initial learning rate set to
0.1. The initial learning rate is dropped by a factor of 0.2
after 50, 100, and 140 epochs. Batch − size is set to 128
with an L2Regularization factor of .0005. Zero − centre
input image normalisation is used for all experiments.
For training variants with DCT data augmentation, we
follow the training protocol described in [1]. In DCT aug-
mentation, each image is first transformed into the frequency
domain. Later, frequency components with relatively less
10
Fig. 8. LP-ReLU2 + DCT has the lowest mFP on both CIFAR-10-P (top) and
Tiny Imagenet-P (bottom,) which is a testament to its performance stability
across 10 perturbations present in these benchmark datasets.
impact on the image are dropped based on a chosen threshold.
Inverse DCT is performed afterwards with the remaining DCT
coefficients for reconstructing the image in spatial domain.
These reconstructed images are fed to train the deep network.
E. Comparing Shift In Feature Space
In this section, we analyse the impact of input corruption in
the intermediate feature space of a CNN. To be more specific,
we demonstrate how a ReLU network fares against a LP-ReLU
network in terms of feature shift due to corruption.
Let us assume a CNN as a feature extractor function
F(x) → CL where CL denotes the feature set C at layer
L. The input to F , i.e., x can either be an image from the
clean set X (x ∈ X) or from a corrupted set Xˆ . Xˆ consists
of elements from X that has undergone a certain corruption
operation, i.e., Corruption∆m(X)→ Xˆ (x ∈ Xˆ) where ∆m
is the corruption magnitude. For a particular CNN, i.e., F to be
robust against input corruption, F has to produce similar CL
for an input from X and its corrupted counterpart Xˆ (ideally
exactly same) as shown in Equation 12.
F(X) ≈ F(Corruption∆m(X)), ∆m→ small
F(X) ≈ F(Xˆ),
(12)
To evaluate how increasing corruption severity affects shift
in feature space, we use the Cosine Similarity (CS). CS is a
widely used metric for calculating the distance between high
dimensional features [45]. We measure CS on six increasing
levels of corruptions present in CIFAR-10-C (see Figure 9).
CS is measured between clean and corrupted features, one
severity level at a time (average CS across layers is reported in
Figure 9). Level 1 represents zero corruption, i.e., clean image
and level 6 represents maximum corruption. Compared to the
baseline, both LP-ReLU1 and LP-ReLU2 maintain higher CS
across severity levels. To put it in simple words, even in the
presence of input corruption, LP-ReLU coupled with DCT
augmentation produces features similar to those produced for
corresponding clean images.
In addition to different severity levels, we also measure
shift at four increasing network depth levels as well. Figure 9
shows that our LP-ReLU based networks maintain the lowest
average shift at all levels. It is also evident from Figure 9
that the shift is benign in the initial layers for ReLU network
and becomes malignant in the deeper layers to a point where
misclassification is inevitable.
As can be seen from Figure 9, features from a noisy digit (2)
remain within the true class perimeter in LP-ReLU networks
even with increasing magnitude of corruption. This is because
of the compactness enforced by the low-pass filtering property
inside LP-ReLU. However, sparsity in ReLU networks means
features start drifting away even with negligible corruption
resulting in misclassification.
F. Training Time
Unlike ReLU, both variants of the proposed LP-ReLU
execute conditional statement during training. LP-ReLU2 does
not host any learnable parameter but LP-ReLU1 does. Under-
standably, these add computational overhead and an additional
time per epoch is required. As can be seen from Table III,
ReLU is the fastest with 50.3 s/epoch. LP-ReLU2 turns out to
be faster than LP-ReLU1 despite having an additional condi-
tional statement. This means LP-ReLU1 requires marginally
greater training time compared to LP-ReLU2 because of
the learnable parameter. However, we found both LP-ReLU
networks to converge to training with fewer epochs compared
to ReLU networks. E.g., ReLU requires [180, 190] training
epochs to reach optimal performance whereas both LP-ReLU
variants perform optimally at 150 epochs. We observed that
the overall training time for ReLU and LP-ReLU variants
are quite similar. We argue that the sparsely represented data
in ReLU requires additional training iterations to reach the
global minima (with respect to the cost function). On the other
hand, LP-ReLU’s data representation is compact by nature and
therefore, requires fewer iterations to reach the global minima.
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF TRAINING TIME WITH DIFFERENT AFS (ON CIFAR-10).
AVERAGE TIME PER EPOCH IS REPORTED IN SECONDS. NUMBER OF
EPOCHS REQUIRED TO REACH CONVERGENCE IS PROVIDED IN A RANGE.
TRAINING PROTOCOL IS SAME AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION IV-D
Network Time/epoch (s) No. of epochs
ReLU 50.3 [180, 190]
Leaky-ReLU 55.0 [185, 190]
P-ReLU 54.5 [180, 190]
C-ReLU 55.9 [140, 145]
LP-ReLU1 62.1 [145, 150]
LP-ReLU2 59.2 [140, 145]
V. VISUALIZING FEATURES AND DECISION SPACE
Visualising features and learned decision boundaries could
deepen our understanding of CNN’s robustness issues. Un-
fortunately, high dimensional features are hard to visualise.
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Fig. 9. (Top Left) With increasing corruption severity, similarity between the clean (level 1) and corrupted (level [2, 6]) features fall sharply in ReLU network
suggesting heavy shift in the intermediate feature space (lower similarity score refers to higher shift in feature space). Similarity score is calculated in the
following severity order: (1 → 1), (1 → 2), (1 → 3), (1 → 4), (1 → 5), (1 → 6). Note that Similarity between the clean image and itself (1 → 1)
is 1. (Bottom Left) The impact of corruption magnifies as similarity falls sharply with increasing network depth in ReLU network. Networks are divided
into four depth levels ([1, 2, 3, 4]) and similarity is then calculated between the corresponding depth levels, i.e., (1 → 1), (2 → 2), (3 → 3), (4 → 4) on
clean and corrupted datasets. (Right) With increasing input corruption (Gaussian noise in this case), features drift far away in ReLU network resulting in
misclassification. Because of a compact feature representation in LP-ReLU networks, shift in feature space is constrained and features stay close to where
they belong (notice the graph scale in X and Y axes to perceive the relative feature compactness/sparsity).
Fig. 10. (a)-(c) To visualize a CNN’s learned decision space on MNIST, a
Fully Connected layer with 2 neurons is added as the penultimate FC layer (we
call it FC2). Once this network is trained, all the layers upto FC2 are pruned
and a tiny 3-layer network is formed (FC2-net). (d) Following Algorithm 1,
(X, Y ) values (generated image features) are systematically fed to FC2-net
and a decision space map is created from the class response.
Dimensionality reduction algorithms based on statistical prop-
erties of features, e.g., PCA [46] and t-SNE [47], are often
used in such cases. However, they do not provide an absolute
feature space and the true decision space remains unknown.
Multi-layer perceptrons could be used as binary classifiers for
a visual explanation, but the notion of data corruption is hard
to replicate in such setups. In this work, rather than using
statistical properties from a high dimensional feature vector
extracted from a CNN’s Fully Connected (FC) layer, we use
a two dimensional FC layer to reduce the dimensions during
training. This way, the network itself provides us with a lower-
dimensional feature set (without using PCA or t-SNE) that is
absolute in nature. In the following section, we provide details
on this feature extraction process and how we can approximate
the learned decision boundary.
To train a CNN on the MNIST dataset, first, we design a
simple 3-convolution layer CNN that achieves ≈ 99% accu-
racy on MNIST (Figure 10(a)). Keeping visualization in mind,
we augment another FC layer (FC2) right before the already
existing FC1 layer with only two neurons (Figure 10(b)).
Interestingly, this network also maintains high classification
accuracy on the test set (≈ 99%). Plots in Figures 1, 9,
and 10 are produced from the FC2 layer features from their
respective CNNs (ReLU is used in one network (ReLU-net)
and LP-ReLU variants in two other networks). No traditional
dimensionality reduction is used as the features themselves are
two dimensional.
A. Decision Space Mapping
From the trained ReLU-net, we prune all the layers up to
the FC2 layer and call this tiny network FC2-net (Figure
12
Algorithm 1 : Decision Space Mapping
Input: Generated Features (Xi, Yi)
Output: Learned Decision Landscape.
1: Init Polar(r, θ) and i = 1
2: where, r ∈ [1 : 1 : N ], θ ∈ [0 : .01 : 2pi]
3: for r = 1 to N do
4: for θ = 0 to 2pi do
5: (Xi, Yi) = Cartesian(Polar(r, θ))
6: [classiscoresi] = classify(2FCnet, (Xi, Yi))
7: if scoresi > 50% then
8: Flagi = 1
9: end if
10: i = i+ 1
11: end for
12: end for
13: Connect ∀(Xi)∃(Yi) (Flag == 1)
10(c)). FC2-net gives us the opportunity to directly mimic
absolute image (digits from 0 to 9) features with simple two
dimensional values (X,Y ).
To map the decision boundary in the feature space, the
following steps are followed:
1) First, we plot FC2 features from ReLU-net, compute the
origin, and fix an initial point in the Polar co-ordinate
P (r, θ) with r = 1 and θ = 0.
2) Next, we keep r unchanged but increase θ by 0.01 up to
2pi and complete a full circle traversal. We start over this
process by incrementing r by 1.
3) While traversing, we move back to Cartesian co-ordinate
and feed the values (FC2 features) to the ReLU-net. We
keep a note of the points where classification score trips
over from one class to another adjacent class (< 50%).
4) Intriguingly, the class label does not alter regardless of
increasing r value as long as θ stays fixed. This means
the decision boundaries are linear and extend to infinity.
5) Interestingly, all inter-class trip over points from Step 2
fall in a straight line (with negligible deviation). This
complements the finding in the last step and joining these
trip over points reveals the true decision boundary (see
Figure 10 for a visual representation).
The entire decision space mapping process is summarised
in Algorithm 1, and visually depicted in Figure 10(b).
While experimenting, we found that classification scores be-
come increasingly extreme with features moving further away
from the manifold. This explains why corrupted instances
often induce unusually high misclassification score in ReLU-
based networks as corrupted features often drift away from
true class. LP-ReLU effectively reduces the open space risk by
enforcing compactness and limiting sensitivity to corruptions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we attribute lack of robustness to unbounded
Activation Functions used in modern networks. We analyse
common corruptions from the frequency domain and suggest
a low-pass filter based replacement for ReLU. LP-ReLU’s
design correlates with the Human Visual System and complies
with the classic signal processing fix to HFc as well. We
also suggest a data augmentation method, i.e., DCT aug-
mentation, which appreciably complements LP-ReLU. Our
proposed modifications strengthen CNN’s robustness and per-
form consistently better across a range of corruptions. These
modifications can easily be incorporated in any existing deep
networks- possibly in other deep learning domains (e.g. Nat-
ural Language Processing) as well.
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